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Abstract 
 
Several Private Information Retrieval (PIR) schemes 
were proposed to protect users’ privacy when sensitive 
information stored in database servers is retrieved. 
However, existing PIR schemes assume that any attack to 
the servers does not change the information stored and 
any computational results. We present a novel fault-
tolerant PIR scheme (called FT-PIR) that protects users’ 
privacy and at the same time ensures service availability 
in the presence of malicious server faults. Our scheme 
neither relies on any unproven cryptographic assumptions 
nor the availability of tamper-proof hardware.  A 
probabilistic verification function is introduced into the 
scheme to detect corrupted results. 
Unlike previous PIR research that attempted mainly to 
demonstrate the theoretical feasibility of PIR, we have 
actually implemented both a PIR scheme and our FT-PIR 
scheme in a distributed database environment. The 
experimental and analytical results show that only modest 
performance overhead is introduced by FT-PIR while 
comparing with PIR in the fault-free cases. The FT-PIR 
scheme tolerates a variety of server faults effectively. In 
certain fail-stop fault scenarios, FT-PIR performs even 
better than PIR. It was observed that 35.82% less 
processing time was actually needed for FT-PIR to 
tolerate one server fault. 
 
Keywords: Distributed database systems, fault 
tolerance, malicious faults, private information retrieval, 
secret sharing, security 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Critical information services such as online stock 
information systems and medical records databases are 
increasingly becoming accessible through the Internet. 
Such applications give rise to significant security and 
reliability problems. From the viewpoint of a system user, 
there are at least two fundamental requirements: privacy 
protection and assurance of service availability. While 
attempting to meet these requirements, a system has to 
cope with software bugs, operator mistakes, and 
malicious attacks  the common causes of service 
interruption [6].  
Protecting the privacy of a user is concerned with a 
method for protecting the identity of the information the 
user is interested in (i.e. the intention) against any attacks 
occurring on the information system side. For example, 
when querying an online stock information system, an 
investor is usually reluctant to reveal the specific stock of 
interest to any other parties including the operators who 
manage the system. This problem is traditionally called 
Private Information Retrieval (PIR). 
Chor et al [7] identified the PIR problem in 1995 and 
proposed several PIR schemes. Their schemes used a so-
called honest-but-curious model in which an attacker may 
observe the transactions performed between a user and the 
information system (so as to find out the intention of the 
user) but not act maliciously. Most research in this field 
[1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 14, 15] has used the same assumption for 
potential attacks.  
A PIR scheme may require a set of replicated servers 
(RS) or use only a single server (SS). In the RS-based 
approach [1, 3, 7, 8], identical database servers are 
replicated on separate nodes of a distributed system. It is 
assumed that communication between the replicated 
servers is limited so that the servers cannot collude 
together in trying to violate the user's privacy [7]. It 
follows that, given unlimited resources, any individual 
server cannot gain any information of the user's intention. 
In the SS-based approach, no replication of servers is 
needed but the computational capability of servers must 
be bounded. For example, the work reported in [4, 14, 15] 
assumes the difficulty of breaking some number-
theoretical problems (e.g. the existence of one-way 
functions). As long as these problems are still hard to 
solve in a computational sense, the user's privacy is 
preserved. 
The existing PIR solutions do not tolerate any type of 
server faults. The honest-but-curious model they used is 
unrealistic. In practice, an attacker may actually spy on 
transactions occurring between a user and a system, stop 
running the servers, tamper with the information stored in 
the servers, and maliciously manipulate results returned to 
the user. A more realistic fault model is urgently needed. 
The previous PIR work has also focussed on 
demonstrating the theoretical possibility of PIR without 
any practical implementation and experimentation 
attempted. The binary bit string model used by the 
existing work is too restricted to be utilised in real 
systems. 
In this paper we introduce a fault-tolerant approach to 
secure information retrieval that guarantees both users’ 
privacy and service availability even in the presence of 
malicious server faults. We present the design and 
implementation details of a fault-tolerant PIR scheme. 
Our work also demonstrates the practical feasibility of 
applying both PIR and FT-PIR to a realistic database 
system and provides significant experimental results and 
performance analysis.  
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 
introduces the system model and gives an overview of 
FT-PIR. Section 3 presents the formal description of FT-
PIR and discusses a verification function for detecting 
corrupted results. Section 4 gives the design and 
implementation details of a PIR scheme and the FT-PIR 
scheme. Section 5 presents experiments and performance 
analysis, and Section 6 discusses the related work briefly. 
Section 7 concludes the paper.  
2. System Model 
 
Consider a synchronous distributed system with a set 
of processing nodes connected by a communication 
network. It is assumed that any message passing amongst 
the nodes is bounded within a given period of time. The 
system contains a set of k replicated servers (called 
replicas) {S1, S2, …, Sk} and a set of clients, running on 
separated processing nodes. The replicas provide 
information services to the clients and the clients take 
inputs from the users of the system. A replica can 
simultaneously deal with multiple clients’ queries, while a 
client may need to send queries to multiple replicas to 
utilise a service.  
A replica stores information using a database or a file 
system. The information is identical for all replicas and is 
modelled as a character string x = x1 x2 … xn of length n. 
Each character xj, where j  {1, 2, …, n}, is an integer 
taken from a given integer set [X-1] = {0, 1, …, X-1}. For 
example, if we encode characters using the ASCII code, 
an eight-bit byte character can be viewed as an integer 
taken from the set {0, 1, …, 255}. In fact the range of this 
set can be adjusted dynamically according to the actual 
data status.  
In order to perform certain operations on x  [X-1]n, 
we associate the set [X-1] with a finite field GF (q), where 
q is a prime number and q  X. Let [q-1] = {0, 1, 2, …, q-
1} be the set of q elements of GF (q). We have x  [X-1]n 
 [q-1]n. Note that the results of operations over a finite 
field, e.g. addition, multiplication, subtraction, and 
division, are still elements of the finite field [16]. 
Protection of Privacy: We now explain briefly the 
principle of private information retrieval. Suppose that a 
user is interested in the character xi stored in a system.  
Within the system, a client takes i as the input from the 
user, where i  {1, 2, …, n}. In order to keep this user's 
intention private from any replica, the client constructs k 
query functions Q1, …, Qk, based on i and some random 
inputs and generates a set of random and thereby 
independent queries. These queries will then be sent to the 
replicas respectively.  
There are k answer functions A1, …, Ak that are defined 
for the replicas respectively and perform read-only 
operations on x. Based on the query submitted from the 
client, each replica executes its answer function to 
generate an answer and sends the answer back to the 
client. The client will then reconstruct xi locally by 
executing a reconstruction function. Finally, the correct 
value of xi will be passed to the user. 
Fault Model: In this paper we take server faults into 
account only. The replicated servers in a system can be 
malicious and behave arbitrarily. The information stored, 
queries and answers may be corrupted. A server may 
return a spurious answer, or collude with other malicious 
servers to violate users’ privacy. 
Fault Tolerance: In order to tolerate malicious server 
faults, redundant but different queries have to be 
generated by the client. Based on a threshold number of 
correct answers from those fault-free replicas, the client 
will be able to reconstruct a correct result. To reduce the 
number of redundant queries needed, a verification 
function may be used to validate the result. 
Our system model differs from the PIR model 
developed in [7] in several ways.  First, the model in [7] 
uses a binary bit string to model the information that is 
hard to implement in practice. Our character string model 
is much more realistic and has been implemented in an 
actual setting. Secondly, we add the fault tolerance 
capability to PIR by a combined use of redundancy and 
result verification. Thirdly, our model assumes malicious 
servers while the model in [7] says that servers may be 
curious but always honest.  
 
3. An FT-PIR Scheme 
 
Consider k replicated servers. Let t be the maximum 
number of faulty replicas, r be a random input to the 
query functions, and Lr be the length of the random input. 
Lq is the length of a query, La is the length of an answer, 
and s1, ... , st, st+1 are elements taken from the set {1, 2, 
…, k}. 
The FT-PIR Scheme: A (t, k) FT-PIR scheme is a 
message passing scheme, where k  2t + 1, and consists of  
k query functions Q1, ..., Qk:  
{1, 2, …, n}  [q-1]Lr   [q-1]Lq 
k answer functions A1, ..., Ak:  
[X-1]
n
  [q-1]Lq   [q-1]La 
A reconstruction function R:  
{1, 2, …, n}  [q-1]Lr   ([q-1]La)t+1   [q-1] 
A verification function V:  
A result res is valid if and only if  
res is the intended result xi  [X-1]  
The scheme should satisfy the following properties: 
a) Correctness: For every x  [X-1]n, i  {1, 2, …, n}, 
and r  [q-1]Lr,  s1, ... , st, st+1  {1, 2, …, k},  
R(i, r, As1(x, Qs1(i, r)), …, Ast+1(x, Qst+1(i, r))) = xi. 
b) Privacy: For every i, j  {1, 2, …, n}, every s1, ... , 
st  {1, 2, …, k}, and Q  [q-1]
Lq
, 
Pr ((Qs1(i, r), Qs2(i, r), …, Qst(i, r)) = Q) =  
Pr ((Qs1(j, r), Qs2(j, r), …, Qst(j, r)) = Q) 
where the probabilities Pr’s are taken over uniformly 
and randomly chosen r  [q-1]Lr. 
c) Safety: The scheme will output only the intended 
result xi  [X-1].  
d) Liveness: The scheme eventually terminates.  
Property a) states that there exists at least one set of 
replicas (i.e. availability) whose answers can be used to 
reconstruct the intended result (i.e. correctness). Property 
b) means that from any set of t queries, it is impossible to 
decide which specific data item the user is interested in 
since the joint distribution of Qs1(i, r), Qs2(i, r), ..., Qst(i, r) 
is independent of i. In other words, from t or less queries 
it is theoretically impossible for a replica or a group of 
replicas to gain any information about i. Property c) is 
guaranteed by the verification function. Property d) holds 
provided that k  2t + 1. 
 
3.1 Construction of an FT-PIR Scheme 
 
A PIR scheme was developed in [7] using the method 
of low degree polynomial interpolation [2]. An FT-PIR 
scheme can be constructed based on the PIR scheme, with 
additional queries. For every j  {1, 2, …, n}, we define a 
function j:[n]  {0, 1}, so that for every l = 1, 2, …, n, 
j(l) = 1, if l = j, otherwise  j(l) = 0. Each query function 
consists of n degree-t polynomials: 
gl(z)  i(l) + rl1z + rl2z
2
 + … + rltz
t
  
for l = 1, 2, …, n 
where the free term of the l-th polynomial is i(l) and  
rl1, rl2, …, rlt   GF(q). 
The client needs to select k non-zero distinct points 
from GF(q), denoted by m1, m2, …,   mk and then sends 
the tuple <g1(md), g2(md), …, gn(md)> as a query to replica 
Sd for d = 1, 2, …, k.  
Each answer function will be in the form:  
,
1
( ) ( )
n
i x
j j
j
F z g z x

   
By the constructions, we know that  
Property 1: F
i, x
 (z) is a polynomial (in z) of degree at 
most t.  
Property 2: The free term of F
i, x
 (z) is F
i, x
 (0) = xi. 
Sd will send the value of F
i, x
 (md) back to the client. 
From k replicas, the client will obtain the values of the 
polynomial F
i, x
 (z) at 2t + 1 distinct points. Based on any t 
+ 1 value pairs, the client will be able to use the Lagrange 
Interpolation formula to reconstruct a result. Without loss 
of generality, assume that the t + 1 value pairs are        
(m1, F
i, x 
(m1)), (m2, F
i, x 
(m2)), …, (mt+1, F
i, x 
(mt+1)). The 
reconstruction function F
i, x
 (z) can be defined as follows.   
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3.2 Probabilistic Result Verification 
 
It is important to notice that the condition k  2t + 1 
implies only the existence of a correct result. In order to 
identify the correct result as the system output, we have to 
either design a perfect verification function or introduce 
further redundancy into queries. Both solutions are costly. 
Probabilistic result verification is desirable in this case 
since it keeps additional redundancy at an acceptable 
level. 
The polynomial interpolation-based PIR schemes and 
our FT-PIR scheme essentially share the same spirit of 
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [18]. All these schemes 
exploit the polynomial properties (i.e. perfect secrecy and 
interpolation uniqueness [12]) for providing privacy 
protection and fault-tolerant operations. It is therefore 
possible to apply the existing results of secret sharing to 
both PIR and FT-PIR schemes. In the following, we 
develop a probabilistic verification function for FT-PIR, 
based on Tompa and Woll’s modification [19] on the 
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme.  This function does not 
guarantee perfect result verification but detects corrupted 
results with a high (and adjustable) probability. 
The main idea of the probabilistic verification function 
is to limit the valid range of reconstructed results. 
Because a character xj (j  {1, 2, …, n}) is an integer 
taken from a pre-known set [X-1], for every xj, there are 
exactly X candidates of valid results. Note that all 
calculations and functions are performed over the finite 
field GF(q). There will be q possible reconstructed results 
for xj over the set [q-1]. It follows immediately that if a 
reconstructed result is within [X-1], it is valid. Otherwise, 
it is invalid. 
Recall that [X-1]
  [q-1]. We can increase the size of 
GF(q) such that most of corrupted results will appear in 
the set [q-1]  [X-1]. In other words, the probability of 
undetected errors can be confined within a pre-defined 
bound e for any e > 0. Although it is possible that a valid 
result in [X-1] is in fact a corrupted result (i.e. not the 
intended result), the probability that this actually happens 
can be controlled by adjusting the field size intentionally.  
According to [19], for a (t, k) FT-PIR scheme, if q > 
max[(X  1)(t/e) + t + 1, k], the probability of undetected 
errors will be less than the arbitrarily small e (for the 
proof, readers are referred to [19]). This ensures that q is 
large enough to reveal the corrupted results with a high 
probability (1– e), e.g. 99.99%. Further discussion about 
how to decide the q in our implemented system will be 
detailed in Section 4 and 5.  
This verification function does not rely on any 
unproven cryptographic premise (e.g. intractability of 
factorisation of big primes) and on the availability 
tamper-proof hardware (e.g. secure processors). The 
probabilistic assurance is guaranteed unconditionally 
provided that the q is determined by the above formula. 
 
3.3 A Control Algorithm for FT-PIR 
 
We will describe a control algorithm that we used to 
implement the FT-PIR scheme. It is assumed that a 
RESULT value is valid if and only if RESULT  [X-1]. 
The control algorithm first initialises the RESULT to be –
1 (a dummy value and viewed as an impossible result). 
The algorithm accepts only a valid RESULT and rejects 
any invalid results. The groupCounter variable counts 
the number of candidate result groups checked so far. 
1. RESULT = –1. 
2. A user feeds an index i to the system. 
3. Use the query functions to generate k queries. 
4. Wait until at least t + 1 answers available. 
5. Set groupCounter to 1; 
6. If groupCounter > 
1
k
t
 
 
 
, stop.  
(In this case, there must be more than t faulty 
servers and the scheme will not be able to 
reconstruct the result.) 
7. Select a new group of t + 1 candidate answers. 
8. Based on the answers in the group, execute the 
reconstruction function to get a RESULT. 
9. Perform the verification function: if the RESULT 
is valid, go to step 10. Otherwise, increment 
groupCounter and go to step 6. 
10. Output the RESULT to the user and stop. 
We can now prove that the FT-PIR scheme with 
probabilistic result verification satisfies the properties 
specified in Section 2, provided that k  2t + 1.  
Theorem 1: The FT-PIR scheme satisfies the 
correctness property.  
Sketch of Proof: By the Lagrange Interpolation 
theorem [16], t + 1 distinct points are necessary and 
sufficient to uniquely determine a polynomial over a finite 
field of degree at most t. By Property 2, the free term of 
the polynomial is uniquely determined. Hence, in the FT-
PIR scheme, t + 1 correct answers can uniquely and 
correctly determine the free term of polynomial F
i, x
 (z), 
i.e. xi. 
    Q.E.D. 
Theorem 2: The FT-PIR scheme satisfies the privacy 
property.  
Sketch of Proof: By the Lagrange Interpolation 
theorem, we know that for a degree t polynomial, the 
knowledge of t (or fewer) points indicates no information 
about the polynomial, i.e. no information about its free 
term. Since the FT-PIR scheme uses the Lagrange 
Interpolation formula as the reconstruction function, any t 
or fewer points indicates no information about the free 
term F
i, x
 (0), i.e. xi.    
     Q.E.D. 
The scheme will only satisfy the safety property with a 
pre-defined probability, but guarantee the liveness 
property. 
 
4. Implementation  
 
This section describes implementations of three 
information retrieval schemes: a normal scheme called 
NIR, the polynomial interpolation PIR scheme described 
in [7], and our FT-PIR scheme. The NIR scheme retrieves 
database records by sending SQL queries in a normal 
way. For NIR there is no protection for users’ privacy and 
no fault tolerance. The PIR scheme protects users’ 
privacy only against honest-but-curious servers, while the 
FT-PIR scheme guarantees both users’ privacy and 
service availability. An identical system architecture, 
depicted in Figure 1, was used for all implementations to 
ensure a fair comparison basis.  
The communication between the client and replicated 
servers are implemented using Java sockets. The input 
from the user will be the index of specific record in the 
server database and the result will be the actual database 
record. The cld is a multithreaded client daemon. It 
interfaces with user-level applications and performs the 
following tasks: taking inputs from the user and returning 
results to it. The cld spawns k client threads cldt1, 
cldt2, …, cldtk to handle communications with 
servers concurrently. There are four major modules 
init(), prepareQuery(), sendQuery(), 
performReconstruction() in the cld daemon 
program for all the implementations. The module init() 
takes parameters from a configuration file to initialise the 
system. In the current implementation, this file resembles 
the queries based on the user's input. The 
prepareQuery() module prepares the queries. The 
sendQuery() module creates k client threads and starts 
to run them immediately. After finishing the 
sendQuery() module, k client threads will communicate 
with k servers concurrently. The 
performReconstruction() module waits until there is 
sufficient number of answers available for the 
reconstruction operation. For the NIR scheme, there is no 
need to perform “reconstruction” since the results will be 
an actual record.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The system architecture. 
In the NIR implementation, the configuration file 
contains only the information for the index of data item 
interested: IndexOfDataItemIntersted. A normal 
SQL statement will be generated by the sendQuery() 
module. The performReconstruction() module 
outputs the records returned from servers as the final 
result.  
For PIR, the configuration file contains two pieces of 
extra information: RandomSeed and 
MaximumNumberOfHonestButCuriousReplicas. 
The prepareQuery() module generates queries by 
setting the order of the finite field and performing 
calculations over the field.  
In the FT-PIR implementation, the configuration file 
contains information: RangeOfData, 
MaximumNumberOfFaultyReplicas, and 
UndetectedErrorRate. The prepareQuery() 
module does a job similar to PIR, but  the calculations 
will take longer time due to the increased order of finite 
fields. The performReconstruction() module 
performs the reconstruction function. Instead of waiting 
for all answers to return, it only has to wait for a sufficient 
number (i.e. t + 1) of answers back from replicas to start 
the reconstruction process.  
On the server side, the server daemon red is also a 
multithreaded program, concurrently dealing with 
multiple queries from clients. For clarity, we did not 
illustrate the multithread feature of red in Figure 1. The k 
replica daemons are denoted by redi, where i = 1, 2, … , 
k. When redi gets a client’s query, it spawns a replica 
thread redt to deal with the query according to the 
answer function. In the current implementation, each 
server thread connects to a back-end database via the 
Java’s JDBC driver. 
For PIR and FT-PIR implantations, two types of 
messages needed to be passed between clients and 
servers: handshake messages and protocol messages. At 
the handshake stage, a client thread sends a message in 
the form of <handshake, nameOfDatabase> to the 
server daemon. Each replica thread will reply with a 
handshake message <handshake, 
lengthOfDatabase, lengthOfRecord>. The client 
thread will then start to send queries to servers. 
Finally, two key modules DBTransformation() and 
cal_Fp() will be executed by the PIR and FT-PIR server 
threads. The former pre-processes the entire database and 
transforms it to an integer array. The latter uses the 
integer array and the query to produce an answer in the 
form of a string. Since these implementations do not 
modify any records and schemas stored in the replicated 
databases, we believe that the implementations described 
in this section are applicable to other realistic database or 
file systems. 
 
5. Experiments and Analysis 
 
This section describes the experiments and analysis 
based on our previous implementations. We will examine 
the performance overheads imposed by both PIR and FT-
PIR, especially their relative performance in a fault-free 
setting as well as in a faulty environment. 
 
5.1 Experimental Environment 
 
The computers used in our experiments were 
connected via a 10MB/sec Ethernet LAN. The network 
delay, measured using the ping command, is always less 
than or equal to 10ms. The client machine is a SUN 
SPARC workstation running Solaris 8.0. All the server 
machines have the same specifications: 400 MHz Pentium 
IIs (celeron) running RedHat Linux (6.0 or 7.2), 3Com 
EtherLink XL 10Mb Ethernet NIC (3C900B-COMBO), 
64 Mbytes of memory, and a 4 Gigabyte hard disk. The 
software used is: Sun JDK (JDK 1.3.1_03 mixed mode), 
MySQL 3.23, and MySQL JDBC Driver mm.mysql-2.0.4. 
Software was installed locally to ensure the independency 
of severs. Each server hosts an identical MySQL database 
containing 10 records. The size of each record is 110 
bytes.  
For PIR, all the computations were performed over the 
finite field GF(257). For FT-PIR, the range of data 
(RangeOfData) was set to be 255 since all the possible 
user
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Input
Result
Client
red1 database
Replicas
red2 database
redk-1 database
redk database
cldt1
cldt2
cldtk-1
cldtk
query
answer
query
answer
query
answer
query
answer
characters are of the form of ASCII code. The value of 
UndetectedErrorRate was set to be 0.03, meaning that 
the verification function detects an invalid result with a 
probability 97%. The order of finite field can be adjusted 
intentionally. For example, when k = 3 (thus tolerating 
one server fault), the field is set to GF(8501). When k = 
11, the field is fixed to GF(42349).  
The garbage collection feature of Java often causes 
performance instability. To overcome this problem, all the 
performance data presented below are averages of more 
than 100 runs. 
 
5.2 Experiments 
 
We are mainly interested the average time taken to get 
a result for the user. As described in the following 
equation, the total processing time (TPT) consists of TPQ 
(time taken to prepare a query), TSQ (time taken to send a 
query), TWRG (time taken to wait for a ready answer 
group), and TR (time taken to reconstruct a result).  
 
TPT = TPQ + TSQ + TWRG + TR. 
 
We also are interested in the maximum time used for 
dealing with all the queries sent to the replicas, denoted 
by TDQmax. Since the client daemon interacts with 
replicas concurrently, TDQmax reflects the actual speed 
of replicas. 
 
A. Comparison between PIR and FT-PIR in a 
Fault-Free Environment 
 
We performed an initial performance comparison 
between NIR and various PIR schemes in [21]. The 
results showed that both PIR and FT-PIR generally 
double the execution cost of NIR. We now investigate the 
extra cost introduced by the FT-PIR scheme against the 
PIR scheme. This extra cost comes from the extra time 
used to compute over a bigger finite field, to generate 
more queries, to deal with more concurrent threads, and to 
verify results.  
To start the reconstruction process, PIR needs all the t 
+ 1 answers returned, while FT-PIR only needs to wait for 
the first group of t + 1 answers from the k = 2t + 1 servers 
returned. Therefore, FT-PIR will automatically use the 
answers from fast machines and ignore the slow 
machines.  
The average of TPT for PIR is about 307ms and the 
standard deviation is always within 6%. As shown in 
Figure 2, the TPT of PIR did not increase as the number 
of replicas increased. This is because PIR’s TR increased 
very slowly, as shown in Figure 3. It is worth to note that 
when k = 3 and 9, the TPT of PIR is longer than the 
others. This is possibly due to the fact that the actual 
performance of machines in this experiment varies quite a 
lot although they have the same specifications.  
Also in Figure 2, FT-PIR displays a different picture. 
When k   9, the TPT of FT-PIR is fairly stable. The TPT 
of FT-PIR’s will not increase much even if the number of 
faults needed to be tolerated increases. As shown in Table 
1, when the number of replicas was increased from 3 to 5 
(i.e. from k3t1 to k5t2), only 3.6% extra processing time 
was imposed on the TPT. But FT-PIR’s TPT increased 
quite dramatically when k > 9 because FT-PIR’s TR 
started to become a major factor (58.91%) of TPT.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. FT-PIR vs. PIR: total processing time (ms).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. FT-PIR vs. PIR: reconstruction time (ms). 
As shown in Table 1, the performance overhead 
introduced by FT-PIR is about 6% when t = 1 and k = 3, 
in comparison with the corresponding PIR 
implementation. In order to tolerate up to two faults, the 
FT-PIR imposes about 26% overhead. When the 
maximum number of faults does not exceed four, the 
performance overhead of FT-PIR is always less than 26%. 
This is a desirable feature because tolerating up to four 
faulty replicas could satisfy most real-world applications.  
Figure 4 and 5 show the respective contribution of 
each specific factor to the total processing time. In PIR, 
the major performance costs are the waiting time (i.e. 
TWRG). The time spent on query preparation (TPQ) and 
sending query (TSQ) contributes a little to TPT for both 
schemes. TR increases steadily but it is still a minor 
contributor in the PIR implementation. In FT-PIR, both 
waiting time (i.e. TWRG) and TR are significant. In 
particular, if the number of elements (i.e. q) of the finite 
field increases, more time has to be spent on 
reconstructing a result. For example, when k = 3, q = 
8501, and when k = 11, q = 42349. Apart from spending 
time on result reconstruction, FT-PIR spends extra time to 
verify the results. 
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Figure 4. Time contributions of PIR. 
 
Figure 5. Time contributions of FT-PIR. 
Table 1. Performance of PIR and FT-PIR (ms). 
PIR TPQ TSQ TWRG TR TPT FT-PIR TPQ TSQ TWRG TR TPT 
k2t1 
4.31 3.38 270.42 3.96 282.08       
1.53% 1.20% 95.87% 1.40% -       
k3t2 
6.47 1.31 328.35 6.88 343.02 
k3t1 
2.16 5.84 345.87 9.76 363.63 
1.89% 0.38% 95.72% 2.01% - 0.59% 1.61% 95.12% 2.68% (+6.01%) 
k4t3 
13.52 5.37 278.03 5.49 302.41       
4.47% 1.78% 91.94% 1.82% -       
k5t4 
4.21 4.06 287.03 5.51 300.81 
k5t2 
1.38 2.59 345.6 27.15 376.72 
1.40% 1.35% 95.42% 1.83% - 0.37% 0.69% 91.74% 7.21% (+25.24%) 
k6t5 
10.84 3.56 276.08 6.01 296.48       
3.66% 1.20% 93.12% 2.03% -       
k7t6 
5.84 10.84 270.08 7.26 294.02 
k7t3 
1.88 6.66 268.44 77.08 354.06 
1.99% 3.69% 91.86% 2.47% - 0.53% 1.88% 75.82% 21.77% (+20.42%) 
k8t7 
14.24 5.36 272.29 8.66 300.56       
4.74% 1.78% 90.60% 2.88% -       
k9t8 
14.68 6.25 298.27 10 329.2 
k9t4 
2.53 9.15 203.75 168.32 383.75 
4.46% 1.90% 90.60% 3.04% - 0.66% 2.38% 53.09% 43.86% (+16.57%) 
k10t9 
15.02 7.1 270.91 11.63 304.66       
4.93% 2.33% 88.92% 3.82% -       
k11t10 
5.71 16.21 281.52 13.38 316.82 
k11t5 
3.95 12.28 204.28 316.09 536.61 
1.80% 5.12% 88.86% 4.22% - 0.74% 2.29% 38.07% 58.91% (+69.37%) 
 
Figure 6 shows the maximum time taken to deal with 
queries. Throughout all the experiments, TDQmax of FT-
PIR was observed to be always shorter than TDQmax of 
PIR, meaning that FT-PIR is always faster than PIR to get 
a ready group in fault-free cases. For k = 3, FT-PIR spent 
35% less time than PIR in terms of the maximum time 
taken to deal with queries. This is simply because FT-PIR 
always selects the fast replicas and ignores the slow ones, 
while PIR has to wait for all the replicas to reply. 
TDQmax is quite stable for both schemes because 1) the 
machines have same specifications and 2) the client 
communicates with replicas concurrently. The standard 
deviation of TDQmax is always within 3% in both cases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. FT-PIR vs. PIR: averaged max time(ms). 
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Figure 7. FT-PIR vs. PIR: averaged waiting time 
(ms). 
  
Figure 8. FT-PIR: averaged time for a ready 
answer group (ms). 
Figure 7 shows the average time to wait for a ready group. 
In PIR, the standard deviation of TWRG is always within 
6%. However, TWRG of FT-PIR drops dramatically as 
the number of replicas increases. Between three and 
eleven replicas, the TWRG decreases 40.94%. 
 
B. Performance of FT-PIR in Faulty Cases 
 
This section describes our effort in investigating the 
performance of FT-PIR in a faulty environment. The fault 
in this section is limited to fail-stop faults  replicas just 
stop serving any queries and deliver no response. 
Although FT-PIR can tolerate malicious faults, we will 
not discuss here the performance implication of malicious 
attacks. This is because simulating the behaviour of 
malicious attackers is a difficult task and requires a 
number of deliberate treatments. The related experiments 
will constitute the core of our further investigation. 
In our experiments, replicas listen to a specific port 
(e.g. 5000) for incoming queries from clients. When 
simulating a faulty replica, we simply change this 
predefined port to another one (say 6000) in the client-
side program. Since no programs run on port 6000, the 
client thread will report a failure of the specific replica. 
Since the maximum number of faulty replicas classifies 
the tests performed, there are only five categories of tests 
in total. We also rotated the replicas in turn to simulate 
faults in the hope that each replica has the same 
probability to fail.  
Table 2 shows the performance of FT-PIR when 
experiencing fail-stop faults. As expected, TPQ and TSQ 
increase as the number of replicas increases. But the total 
of TPQ and TSQ is always less than 4% of TPT. 
TDQmax is stable for all the experiments. The standard 
deviation of TDQmax is identical for PIR and FT-PIR. 
Again, TR becomes the major contributor to TPT as the 
number of replicas increases. 
For each category (for example, k9t4 – f4, k9t4 – f3, 
k9t4 – f2, and k9t4 – f1, where f is the number of actual 
faulty replicas), TPT does not increase as f increased. The 
standard deviation of TPT in the above example is within 
2%. This is because TWRG and TR did not change much 
for the same number of f. TWRG and TR are the major 
factors in deciding TPT for FT-PIR. 
Figure 8 shows that TWRG in faulty cases is generally 
less than that in the fault-free case. In fact, we only need 
to check less group combinations. However, as discussed 
before, this is also related to the speed of replicas. As 
expected, in Figure 9 TR is nearly the same for both cases 
since given same pieces of answers it should take the 
same time to reconstruct a result. Faults have no impact 
on TR in general. 
Table 2. FT-PIR average performance in faulty scenarios experiments (ms): fail-stop faults. 
FT-PIR k3t1 k5t2 k7t3 k9t4 k11t5 
TPQ 1.45 0.62% 0.43 0.15% 1.5 0.49% 2.14 0.53% 2.68 0.49% 
TSQ 2.25 0.96% 4.72 1.68% 8.24 2.67% 11.31 2.80% 15.14 2.75% 
TWARG 223.08 95.59% 247.1 87.99% 219.12 70.93% 214.35 53.08% 209.18 37.94% 
TR 6.58 2.82% 28.58 10.18% 80.07 25.92% 176.01 43.59% 324.35 58.83% 
TPT 233.36 - 280.83 - 308.93 - 403.81 - 551.35 - 
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Figure 10 shows the performance of FT-PIR in both 
fault-free and faulty cases. The pattern in Figure 10 is a 
combination of the patterns shown in Figure 8 and 9. 
Initially, TWRG is the major factor in TPT.  As the 
number of replicas increases, TR becomes a major 
contributor to TPT.  
An important observation is that FT-PIR performs 
even better in the faulty cases than in the normal cases. In 
particular, when k = 3 (i.e. t = 1), 35.82% less TPT is 
observed. When k = 11 (i.e. t = 5), on average, it is only 
2.75% extra time spent in the faulty cases. However, this 
saving decreases with an increase of k because TR (the 
reconstruction and verification time) becomes the major 
factor of TPT.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. FT-PIR: reconstruction time (ms). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Performance comparisons of FT-PIR: 
normal cases against faulty cases (ms). 
 
6. Related Work 
 
There are a number of research areas related to our 
work: 1) PIR, 2) combination of Fault Tolerance and 
Security, and 3) protection of software execution in an 
untrusted environment. As discussed in Section 1, the PIR 
schemes are theory-focussed and based on the honest-but-
curious model.  
There are several proposals that use some form of 
“encrypted” data shares to achieve better security and 
reliability of systems. Typical examples include UC 
Berkeley’s oceanstore [17], CMU’s PASIS system [11], 
the Fragmentation-Redundancy-Scattering technique 
developed in [9, 10], and the IBM’s e-Valt project [13]. 
MIT’s Byzantine Fault Tolerance [6], the EU’s MAFTIA 
project [5] and the COCA system [22] are other examples 
that address both security and fault tolerance issues of 
servers in asynchronous distributed systems. However, all 
the above proposals and systems have traditionally 
focussed on protecting critical information on the server 
side rather than the privacy of the system users.  
Our work may be loosely categorised as a combination 
of fault tolerance and security, but with an emphasis on 
the protection of users’ privacy from a variety of faults 
and guarantee the service availability for users. Unlike the 
above examples, our new scheme does not require vast 
message passing for the purpose of coordinating 
operations between nodes, and not rely on any unproven 
cryptographic premises to detect corrupted results.  
Existing approaches for protecting software in an 
untrusted environment generally have only a limited 
capability to guarantee the data privacy and to tolerate 
malicious faults. In [20], Wang et al. proposed to use 
software transformation to protect software. It is expected 
that after transformation, an attacker may find difficult to 
understand the program. However, this approach could 
not tolerate any data tampering type attacks.  
 
7. Conclusions and Future Work 
 
Previous PIR research mainly demonstrated the 
theoretical feasibility of PIR schemes based on a simple 
model of binary bit strings. All the theoretical work 
assumed the honest-but-curious model without addressing 
malicious attacks. Our work shows that it is possible to 
enhance PIR with an ability to detect and tolerate 
malicious faults. A probabilistic algorithm for error 
detection is derived and embedded into an FT-PIR 
scheme. It can detect the occurrence of corrupted results, 
and thereby reject them with a high probability. We have 
also demonstrated the practical feasibility of our approach 
by designing and implementing the FT-PIR scheme in a 
real distributed database environment. The comprehensive 
performance analysis shows that the general performance 
of FT-PIR is highly acceptable and comparable with 
typical PIR schemes. In many cases, FT-PIR performs 
even better than PIR. 
There are at least four possible extensions to this work 
in the future. First, we plan to investigate the relationship 
amongst different factors (e.g. the size of a database) of 
the system performance. Secondly, we will explore the 
scalability of the system by varying the number of 
concurrent clients. Thirdly, it would be interesting to 
develop schemes that protect both users’ privacy and 
servers’ privacy together in the presence of malicious 
faults. Finally, we plan to extend our initial work by 
considering a model for asynchronous distributed 
systems.  
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